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We examine the role of money in the policies of the ECB, using introductory statements 
of the ECB President at the monthly press conferences during 1999-2004. Over time, the 
relative amount of words devoted to the monetary analysis has decreased. Our analysis of 
indicators of the monetary policy stance suggests that developments in the monetary 
sector, while somewhat more important in the later half of the sample, only played a 
minor role most of the time. Our estimates of ECB interest rate decisions suggest that the 
ECB’s words (monetary-sector based policy intensions) are not an important determinant 
of its actions. 
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Ever since its inception, the European Central Bank (ECB) has been criticized for its 
monetary policy strategy (see De Haan et al., 2005 for a discussion). A particular 
controversial element in the ECB strategy is the role of money.
1 In addition to a broad 
assessment of the risks to price stability (the so-called “economic analysis”, previously 
called the “second pillar”), the ECB uses a quantitative reference value for the annual 
growth rate of a broad monetary aggregate (M3) to assess whether monetary 
developments pose a risk to price stability (“monetary analysis”, previously called the 
“first pillar”). According to Jaeger (2003), initial ECB comments on its strategy 
suggested that money would be a dominant input into policy decisions.
2 After an 
evaluation of its monetary policy strategy, the ECB Governing Council decided in May 
2003 that the introductory statement of the ECB President after a Governing Council 
meeting will henceforth start with the economic analysis to identify short to medium-term 
risks to price stability. The monetary analysis will then follow to assess medium to long-
term trends in inflation in view of the close relationship between money and prices over 
extended horizons.
3 This decision was widely interpreted as implying that money has 
become less important in the ECB monetary strategy. For instance, according to De 
Grauwe (2003): “the ECB is downgrading the importance of the money stock (M3) in its 
monetary policy strategy, and rightly so. It just did not make sense anymore to pretend 
that the money stock is the most important variable to watch. This variable is so much 
polluted by noise that it rarely gave the right warning signal of future inflation.”
4 
However, on various occasions, the ECB has stressed that, as in the past, the monetary 
analysis still plays a role in its monetary strategy. Still, according to Gerlach (2004), most 
econometric estimates of reaction functions for the euro area fail to find that money 
growth plays a role in the ECB’s interest rate decisions.
5  
In this paper we examine the role of money in the ECB monetary policy strategy 
using the ECB’s most important communication device, i.e. the President’s introductory 
statement at the monthly press conference in which he reports on the decisions taken by 
the ECB’s Governing Council. The statement is understood to reflect the position and 
                                                 
1 Summarizing the critique, Gerlach (2004) argues that the ECB would be ill advised to disregard monetary 
factors, but that taking proper account of these does neither necessarily entail monitoring the growth rate of 
M3, nor does it require a separate monetary pillar. 
2 When, for instance, ECB President Duisenberg was asked during the press conference on 13 October 
1998 on the relative importance of money he noted that “... it is not a coincidence that I have used the 
words that money will play a prominent role. So if you call it the two pillars, one pillar is thicker than the 
other is, or stronger than the other, but how much I couldn't tell you”. 
3 Duisenberg explained these changes at the beginning of the press conference on May 8
th, 2003: “The 
introductory statement will henceforth present first economic analysis, followed by monetary analysis. It 
concludes by cross-checking the analyses conducted under these two pillars.” 
4 Similarly, Svensson (2003) summarizes the Governing Council decision as follows: “Keeping the two-
pillar strategy but reducing the prominence of the first pillar by putting it second and discussing the 
monetary pillar (relabeled “monetary analysis”) after the “broadly-based assessment” (relabeled “economic 
analysis”), seeing it mainly as a means of “cross-checking” the “economic analysis”. This is a change in the 
right direction, but it is not enough.” 
5 Recently, Carstensen and Colavecchio (2004) estimated several Taylor-type reaction functions for the 
ECB and conducted a structural change analysis using both recursive parameter estimates and structural 
change tests. They do not find clear-cut evidence in favour of a break after the revision. 
  2views of the Council, agreed upon on a word-by-word basis by its members, and—other 
than, for instance, the editorial included in the Monthly Report—focuses almost 
exclusively on matters of monetary policy. More specifically, we quantify and analyze 
the policy implication contained in the introductory statement: we extract the ECB’s 
overall policy intention stemming from its aggregated view of the economy, and the 
ECB’s views on certain disaggregated economic developments and their policy 
implications, in particular monetary indicators, price stability, and developments in the 
real economy. 
Since monetary policy is increasingly becoming the art of managing expectations, 
communication has developed into a key instrument in the central bankers’ toolbox in 
recent years. It is therefore no surprise that recently various papers on central bank 
communication have been published. Broadly speaking, this research can be 
distinguished in two (not mutually exclusive) groups of studies. The first group consists 
of studies examining communication strategies of central banks (e.g. Blinder et al., 2001 
and Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2005), while the second group consists of studies in which 
the effect of communication on financial markets is analysed (e.g. Fratzscher, 2004 and 
Jansen and De Haan, 2005a). 
Two papers on ECB communication come close to ours. Like the present paper, 
Rosa and Verga (2005) transform the qualitative information of the ECB press 
conferences into an ordered scale, verifying empirically to what extent market 
expectations react to the information released by the ECB. They find that the public not 
only understands but also believes the signals sent by the European monetary authority. 
Heinemann and Ullrich (2005) also use the introductory statements by the ECB President 
at the monthly press conference to construct a wording indicator reflecting the 
“hawkishness” of monetary rhetorics, integrating this indicator into a standard Taylor 
type model for the interest rate. They find that the wording indicator can improve the 
model’s fit when added to the standard explanatory variables. Our paper differs from 
these studies in two ways. First, we use the introductory statements of the ECB president 
for a different purpose, i.e. to examine whether the ECB’s monetary policy strategy has 
changed. Second, we use a different method to transform qualitative information into 
quantitative information. Not only do we come up with an indicator of the ECB’s overall 
policy intention stemming from its aggregated view of the economy, we also have 
indicators of the ECB’s views on certain disaggregated economic developments 
coinciding with the “economic analysis” and the “monetary analysis”.  
Our main finding is that developments in the monetary sector did not play a 
significant role most of the time when explaining the overall policy stance as 
communicated by the introductory statements of the ECB president. Also when it comes 
to actual policy, our estimates of ECB interest rate decisions suggest that money never 
did significantly matter. There are indications that the role of money has slightly 
changed, but most likely this change occurred before May 2003. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines 
communication of the ECB on its monetary policy strategy in some detail and explains 
our methodology. Section 3 presents the outcomes of our analysis based on simply 
counting words, while sections 4 and 5 shows the results for our indicators of the 
monetary policy stance. The final section offers some concluding comments. 
 
  32. Quantifying communication by the ECB on its monetary policy strategy 
Researchers have highlighted three reasons why communication may prove useful for 
central banks. First and foremost, communication may be a very direct and effective tool 
to influence expectations. Therefore, it plays a seminal role in improving the 
effectiveness of policy and, consequently, the economy’s overall performance (e.g. 
Blinder, 1998 and Bernanke, 2004). In some instances and under some circumstances—
such as when nominal interest rates are close to the zero lower bound—communication 
may even function as the sole tool to anchor and guide market expectations. Second, 
communication may be used to reduce noise in financial markets (e.g. Posen, 2003). 
Greater disclosure and clarity over policy may lead to greater predictability of central 
bank actions, which, in turn, reduces the uncertainty in financial markets. Finally, 
communication is indispensable from the perspective of central bank accountability. As 
central banks have become more independent over time, they have to pay closer attention 
to explaining what they do and what underlies their decisions. The increased use of 
communication is partly a logical consequence of this development (Issing, 2005 and De 
Haan and Eijffinger, 2000). 
A number of factors make communication particularly difficult for the ECB. First, 
it is a relatively young international organization with a Council and staff reflecting the 
cultural heterogeneity of the euro area. Talking with “one voice” might be difficult under 
these circumstances. Indeed, Jansen and De Haan (2005b) show that statements by ECB 
officials are often contradictory. Second, the message of the ECB may not be easy to 
convey. As pointed out in the Introduction, the monetary policy strategy of the ECB 
differs from those of other central banks, containing elements of monetary and inflation 
targeting. As a result, surveys suggest that professional economists often feel that they do 
not have a good understanding of the ECB’s policy (De Haan et al., 2005).
6 Third, the 
ECB has to deal with a large number of different media coming from various countries 
and having different traditions. As Hämäläinen (2001)—at the time member of the 
Executive Board of the ECB—puts it: “communication is not easy in a pan-European 
context in which differing cultures, languages, traditions and motives affect how 
messages are interpreted by the different counterparties involved.” 
Central bank communication may use various channels: press conferences, 
minutes of the meetings of the decision-making council, monthly bulletins, speeches and 
interviews. One important communication device of the ECB is the introductory 
statement by the ECB President for the press after the meetings of the Governing 
Council. In the morning of its meeting days, the Governing Council decides whether or 
not to modify its key interest rates. In his introductory statement the President explains 
the reasons for such decisions and gives the ECB’s opinions on the risks for price 
stability and growth. In its Monthly Bulletin of November 2002 (p.64), the ECB stated 
that “The President’s introductory statement at the press conference provides a 
                                                 
6 Even by its own accord, the European Central Bank (ECB) faces a communication gap. As Issing (2001) 
writes, “[o]n the one hand, few observers contest the success and credibility of the ECB in delivering on its 
primary objective and on the appropriateness of most of its policy actions in this regard... On the other 
hand, however, the overall perception of the ECB by the public, academics, financial analysts, market 
participants, and not least, journalists continues to remain—at best—rather mixed.” Indeed, in an article in 
the Wall Street Journal the ECB is considered a central bank “that cannot master communication” (Sims 
and Wessel, 2000). 
  4comprehensive summary of the policy-relevant assessment of economic developments. It 
is structured along the lines of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy and agreed by the 
Governing Council.” 
Thus, the information provided in the introductory statement allows answering a 
number of questions. For instance, what is the relative importance of the “monetary 
analysis” for ECB communication compared to the “economic analysis”? Or, more 
pointedly, does the ECB pay more than lip-service to the monetary analysis? Moreover, 
has the relative importance of the monetary analysis changed over time? In particular, did 
the ECB indeed downgrade the former “first pillar” of it policy-making framework in 
May 2003? As discussed above, in May 2003 the ECB changed the structure of the 
introductory statement, highlighting the importance of non-monetary (or economic) 
issues. The Council stressed that the “new structure of the introductory statement will 
better illustrate that these two perspectives [i.e. the economic and the monetary analysis] 
offer complementary analytical frameworks to support the Governing Council’s overall 
assessment of risks to price stability”, and it argued that, as in the past, monetary analysis 
will take into account developments in a wide range of monetary indicators including 
M3, its components and counterparts, notably credit, and various measures of excess 
liquidity. However, a number of academic observers (like De Grauwe, 2003 and 
Svensson, 2003) have interpreted these changes as an important step away from 
Bundesbank-style monetary targeting. 
Our data set consists of a total of 68 introductory statements of press conferences 
held after the meetings of the Governing Council. Our first observation is on January 7
th, 
1999;
7 the last one is on December 2
nd, 2004. We proceed in two steps. As a first step we 
will simply count words to analyse whether—and if so, when—the monetary analysis has 
become less important. The next step is to quantify the informational content of the 
introductory statement. The statement generally starts with a brief summary of the 
decision taken and the reasons underlying this decision, sometimes combined with an 
outlook on the future monetary policy stance endorsed by the Governing Council. Mainly 
based on this first section and the concluding section often added toward the end of the 
statement, we compute an indicator for the overall monetary policy stance communicated 
by the Governing Council. The indicator categorizes the overall monetary policy stance 
on a scale from –3 (strong inclination to lower rates); –2; –1; 0 (neutral); +1; +2; and +3 
(strong inclination to increase rates).
8 Furthermore, in line with the contents of the 
introductory statement we distinguish the implied policy stance for three subcategories 
based on the communicated information on: (1) price stability, (2) the real economy, and 
(3) monetary indicators. In all three cases, we compute the indexes exclusively based on 
the information contained in the dedicated sections of the introductory statements, 
excluding the introductory and concluding sections. Table 1 provides some examples for 
the three subcategories. As with the overall stance, these statements have been 
categorized on a scale running from –3 to +3.  
 
 
                                                 
7 Hence, we neglect the seven press conferences held by the ECB before the introduction of the euro, i.e. 
before January 1
st, 1999. 
8 This is similar to Rosa and Verga (2005); Heinemann and Ullrich (2005) only distinguish between easing, 
neutral and tightening.  
  5[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
As pointed out Rosa and Verga (2005), the task of categorizing is helped to some 
extent by the fact that the language employed in the introductory statements is—to a 
degree—standardized, with a number of key words or strings reappearing with some 
regularity. Examples of (strings of) such key words are: “appropriate”, “in line with”, 
“for the time being”, “carefully monitor”, “vigilant”, “upward/downward risks”, 
“more/less favourable”, “uncertainties”, “tilted to the up/downside”, “inflationary 
pressures”, and “above/below potential growth”. However, the introductory statement is 
not a short document (the average statement in our sample has more than 1,300 words) 
and the standardization of the language used is far from perfect (the use of key words 
changes over time and standardization is not necessarily applied consistently to all 
sections). As a consequence, the coding of policy intentions is based on our reading of 
the full statement. 
An important advantage of extracting from the introductory statements not only 
the ECB’s aggregate policy intentions but also its intentions based on its disaggregated 
analyses of developments regarding price stability, the real economy, and the monetary 
sector is that it highlights potential tensions between subcategories and allows exploring 
the ECB’s (possibly changing) way of dealing with these tensions. Take, for instance, the 
press conference of February 4
th, 1999. While the Governing Council states that there are 
no “significant upward or downward pressures on prices in the short term”, the 
information concerning the real economy suggests “downward risks for output growth”, 
while the growth of credit causes some concern and therefore has to be “carefully 
monitored”. So by comparing the information on the various subcategories with the 
overall monetary policy stance—based on the overall index and actual interest rate 
decisions taken—we are able to examine the role of money in the way the ECB 
communicates its policy intentions. Table 2 (upper panel) shows the correlation amongst 
the various indexes. An interesting message is that the correlation of the average 
monetary indicator with the other subindicators and the indicator of the overall policy 
stance is relatively low as compared to the subindexes based on the ECB’s comments on 
price stability and the real sector.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Communication is not a one-way street, and the empirical analysis has to control 
for differences in perception. To limit the influence of individual idiosyncrasies in this 
regard, the scaling of the overall and disaggregated policy stances communicated by the 
ECB was done by three different teams that operated independently from one another. 
Examples for the scores of the teams are shown behind the statements in Table 1. The 
average (or consensus) score of the teams is used in the empirical analyses.
9 Table 2, in 
addition to showing the correlation amongst the various average indexes, also shows  the 
correlation of the coding of the various teams with these averages (lower panel). The first 
notable finding here is that, in general, the team-based indicators move more or less in 
                                                 
9 We have also experimented with other ways of aggregating the team scores, like the first principal 
component, the median, an average of standardized series, etc. The qualitative results are by no means 
affected by this. 
  6sync with the averages. Interestingly, however, the correlation of the monetary indicators 
for each of the teams and the final average monetary indicator are relatively low. 
Apparently, the monetary part in the introductory statements leads to the greatest 
variation in the assessment among the teams. Apparently, the message send by the 
Governing Council regarding its policy stance is somewhat less precise when it comes to 
the monetary sector. 
  
3. The importance of money: word count 
In a first attempt to capture some of the information contained in the introductory 
statements, we conducted a simple word count. In particular, we identified, grouped, and 
counted words in full sentences occurring at any point in the introductory statement 
addressing a number of key issues. The first group contains statements referring to price 
developments, the second group of statements refers to the state of the real economy, the 
third to the monetary sector, and the fourth to a variety of other topics with some 
relevance to monetary policy, including exchange rate developments, the financial sector, 
or issues related to fiscal policy.
10 A residual group, which we will ignore from now 
onwards, consists of words related to organizational issues. Figure 1 presents the 
distribution of words among our four groups for all 68 introductory statements during the 
1999-2004 period and Table 3 provides a number of summary statistics.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 and Table 3 here] 
 
It follows from Figure 1 and Table 3 that the weight allocated to the subjects of 
price stability, real economy, and other topics in the introductory statements is roughly 
equal, about 22-23  percent each. The monetary sector was given somewhat broader 
coverage in the range of 33 percent. However, this does not imply that the monetary 
analysis is more important than the economic analysis, as the latter relies on information 
on price developments and developments in the real economy. A second observation is 
that the proportion of words allocated to the monetary sector has decreased over time.   
It has recently been argued in the literature that a central bank analyzes the 
economy in an asymmetric way over the business cycle, i.e. during periods of monetary 
tightening particular elements—like price stability or the real economy—might be given 
a different weight than during periods of monetary loosening. For instance, Cukierman 
(2000) argues that central bankers are not completely insensitive to social and political 
pressure and therefore more inclined to offsetting positive output gaps than negative ones 
for a given level of inflation.
11 Goodhart (1998) argues that central banks that need to 
build up reputation (like the ECB) might show a precautionary demand for low inflation, 
i.e. would rather have inflation below than above target, everything else being equal.
12 
                                                 
10 As these other topics are not discussed on a continuous basis, it is not possible to construct policy stance 
measures on these (as we did with price developments, the real economy, and the monetary sector). 
11 See also Gerlach (2003) for a formal analysis. 
12 See Aguiar and Martins (2005), Ruge-Murcia (2003a,b) and Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) for empirical 
tests. Cukierman and Muscatelli (2002) build a model that gives a theoretical foundation for both a larger 
weight on inflation and a larger weight on output: If the central bank has to build up reputation, they put 
more weight on price stability to keep inflation expectations low. If the central bank has already built up 
enough reputation, the precautionary demand for economic expansions rises. 
  7Therefore, we split the sample in two parts. In the first half of the sample, i.e. up to April 
2001, the interest rates as set by the ECB were on the rise, whereas in the second half 
they were falling. Splitting the sample in April/May 2001, we note that monetary issues 
dominated before 2001 (at about 38  percent of the word count for the four groups 
selected) but fell to significantly lower levels (about 31  percent) thereafter. The 
associated gains occurred mostly in the other topics category.
13 With respect to the 
monetary sector and other topics we cannot reject that there is a break between April and 
May 2001. 
It is interesting to more precisely pinpoint structural changes in the ECB’s 
communication, in particular with respect to the role of monetary analysis. To that end 
we perform the Andrews and Ploberger (1994) structural break tests for a linear 
regression, with p-values using Hansen’s (1997) approximations.
14 The optimal threshold 
date for the monetary sector is only shortly after May 2001, i.e. in December. The 
optimal break for the other topics category is July 2001 and hence occurs almost around 
the same time. For the other two components we do not find a significant threshold 
anywhere in our data. However, the threshold tests contained in Figure 2 suggest that the 
significance of the decrease in the weight monetary issues received is fairly independent 
of the precise date chosen.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
While these results are interesting, fewer words do not necessarily imply less 
importance when it comes to influencing the ECB’s policy intentions as communicated 
through the introductory statements. For instance, the statements might include fewer 
words allocated to the monetary sector during the post-2001 period because the policy 
implications of the analysis stemming from the monetary sector became clearer. In the 
following section we will therefore analyse the role of money in the ECB monetary 
policy strategy using the indicators as outlined in Section 2. 
 
4. The importance of money: analysis of our indicators  
The stance-indicators we constructed on the basis of the press conferences can each take 
on values between -3 (strong inclination to lower interest rates) and +3 (strong inclination 
to increase interest rates). Three topics return in each statement: developments in the 
monetary sector, price developments, and developments in the real economy. Besides 
looking at the overall policy intention, we will also look at these three underlying 
components.  
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
                                                 
13 Within the group of other topics there have been some clear shifts across time. Whereas comments on the 
financial sector almost completely disappeared and exchange rate issues also got less attention, other 
policy and especially fiscal policy issues more than compensated for this after May 2001.  
14 A series of LM statistics are generated for breaks at each of the points in the middle range of the data set. 
The break generating the highest LM statistic is the most likely candidate. To approximate p-values, it uses 
an exponentially weighted average of these LM statistics. 
  8As Figure 3 shows, the three sub indicators and our overall measure of policy 
intention coincide pretty much up until the summer of 2001 (July 5
th, 2001), the time at 
which all indicators took a more or less neutral position. After that our indicator for the 
monetary sector departs from the other indicators, to maintain a high and relatively stable 
value ever since. Even when putting the monetary sector aside, price developments and 
developments of the real economy as described in the press statements are clearly more 
out of line after the summer of 2001 than before. What the data in Figure 3 furthermore 
suggest is that the overall policy stance leaned more on the assessment of price 
developments in the early half and at the very end of our sample, whereas the real 
economy appeared to set the tone during the second half of 2002 up until the end of 2003.  
As the overall policy indicator has not been directly derived from the three 
underlying components, it is possible to test what the implicit weights are that the ECB 
assigns to these sub indicators. Given that all indicators are defined over the interval (-3, 
3) where the value zero represents the neutral position for all, the regressions do not 
contain a constant. Hence, we assume that the average overall policy position is neutral 
once we have corrected for the underlying three sectors.
15
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Column (1) of Table 4 reveals that over the entire period, price developments as 
well as developments in the real economy were given the largest weights in judging the 
overall situation. Monetary developments were clearly given a much smaller weight. The 
Durbin-Watson statistic shows that there is positive autocorrelation in the residuals of this 
first equation. A potential reason might be that previous press statements echo on to the 
subsequent one. To test for this policy inertia effect we include the lagged dependent 
variable in the Column (2) of Table 4. The estimated coefficient is significant; however, 
the estimated size of this effect is far less than for both the coefficients of price stability 
and the real economy.
16 Note furthermore, that the general LM test of Godfrey (1978) 
and Breusch (1978) is highly significant, still indicating problems with respect to the 
residuals and therefore the specification. 
As Figure 3 suggests that the implicit weights given by the central bank might 
have changed over time, we allow the econometric model to differentiate the coefficients 
of interest across sub periods. A likely candidate is the turning point in the interest rate 
cycle in May 2001, but none of the following results depend on the precise timing of the 
break. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 redo the previous two specifications, taking this 
break into account. The estimated changes in coefficients in the second part of the sample 
along with their test statistics are reported in the lower half of the table.  
A first result is that the problems associated with the residuals presented in 
columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 seem indeed to be related to a structural break in the 
                                                 
15 The only plausible reason for having a constant in the regressions would be if there would a fourth 
component relevant for the ECB which on average does not have a neutral stance. Hence, we assume here 
that all other determinants of the overall policy stance have on average a value of zero and are therefore 
part of the residual. We have also run the regressions including a constant; it turned out that it is in most 
situations insignificant and does not alter our qualitative conclusions. 
16 Including lagged values of the three sub indicators instead results in insignificant estimate for all 
additional coefficients. Hence, once contemporaneous values of the three sectors are included, their 
previous values do not add aditional information. 
  9underlying data. Both the Durbin-Watson in Column (3) and the LM statistic in Column 
(4) become insignificant once we allow for a structural break between April and May 
2001. The Chow test indicates that the changes in the coefficients after the break are 
jointly highly significant. Before the break, price developments were clearly the most 
important determinant of the ECB’s policy stance, whereas after the break that role was 
taken over by developments in the real economy. As there does not appear to be a 
significant change in the policy inertia parameter over the two periods, we presume that 
this kind of inertia is not sample dependent in Column (5) of Table 4. Interestingly, 
developments in the monetary sector did not play a significant role before the break, 
while after the break its impact is significant, albeit at relatively modest levels. Our 
preferred specification is shown in Column (6) of Table 4 in which the weight on the 
monetary sector in the first half of the sample is set equal to zero. This merely 
strengthens the previous findings.  
The evidence suggests that, in contrast to what many observers argue, the role of 
the monetary analysis—as represented in the ECB President’s introductory statement at 
the monthly press conference—has not been reduced in importance in the second half of 
our sample period. The opposite appears to be more likely. Still, money only plays a 
relatively minor role in determining the ECB’s policy stance. Even post May 2001, in our 
preferred specification, the coefficient measuring the importance of the monetary sector 
in determining the ECB’s overall monetary policy stance is only somewhat more than a 
third of the coefficient for the real sector and little more than two-thirds of the coefficient 
for the price sector.
17
So far, the threshold of April 2001 has been selected on theoretical grounds—but 
does this also coincide with what the data tell us? Figure 4 shows the results when testing 
for the date of a threshold break in our regression shown in Column (2) of Table 4 using 
the Andrews and Ploberger (1994) approach. The highest test statistic prevails for July 
4
th, 2002. However, the figure also clearly shows that during the period October 2000 and 
October 2002, the test statistic takes on high values (which are always significant on a 1 
percent level). Hence, it is difficult for the data to assess the exact threshold point. 
However, there clearly is a break in the weights the empirical model allocates to the three 
sectoral indicators and the most likely time window for this break includes the turning 
point in the ECB’s interest rate cycle, that is, May 2001. In contrast, a break in May 
2003—the date at which the ECB Governing Council announced some changes in their 
way of communicating the two pillars—appears to be less likely. 
 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
 
                                                 
17 See column (6) in Table 4. As mentioned above, the coefficient for the monetary sector is zero before 
May 2001. To compare coefficients in the second period, the estimated coefficients in the middle and lower 
panels of Table 4 have to be added. The quantitative-economic impact of the monetary indicator is even 
smaller than what the relative size of the coefficient suggests, as the monetary indicator is less volatile than 
the price and real indicator during this part of the sample period. 
 
  105. Are the Deeds Following the Words? 
Our analysis of the previous section suggests that the monetary pillar has played a minor 
role in determining the overall monetary policy stance according to our overall policy 
indicator. One may, of course, argue that despite the theoretical arguments put forward in 
section 2, it is not words but deeds that count. Did the ECB follow up its communication 
by action? To answer this question, we have first to decide whether to look at all ECB 
policy decisions over the sample period under consideration, i.e. 108 meetings of the 
General Council, or to focus only on the 68 meetings that were followed by a press 
conference with an introductory statement of the President agreed upon by the Governing 
Council. Because the decision to hold a press conference and/or prepare an introductory 
statement is in itself part of the ECB’s communication strategy, using the full 108 
meeting data set seems to be called for. However, the results reported below do not 
change substantially if we constrain the analysis to the 68 observations for which 
introductory statements are available. 
In  Table 5 we regress the ECB’s main refinancing rate (MRR) on our three 
measures of communicated monetary policy, i.e. price developments, real economy and 
monetary sector. In the left part of that table, where we explain the actual level of the 
MRR, we also include a constant, the policy rate as it is shortly before the Governing 
Council meeting, and its change as made in the previous meeting.
18 In this way our 
Taylor-rule type of equation allows for the usual policy inertia. As it might be argued that 
the policy rate resembles a non-stationary process, we also show—in the middle part of 
the table—the results using the first-difference of the main refinancing rate as our 
dependent variable. Interest rate decisions do have a rather discrete character; in practice 
the MRR only changes by steps of 25 basis points or 50 basis points. To econometrically 
cope with this, the right part of Table 5 reports results using an ordered probit 
estimator.
19 Note that overall the results do not depend upon these three distinct ways in 
which we set up our model. 
It is generally agreed that communication not only serves to justify actions taken, 
but also to prepare markets for upcoming changes. Hence, communication is likely to be 
forward-looking. For that reason, we include besides the contemporaneous values of our 
press release indicators also their lagged ones.  
Furthermore, given the results in the previous sections, we expect a significant 
break during our sample. As before, we start by assuming this break to potentially take 
place in May 2001. We will subsequently test for this. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
All together this results in a rather comprehensive first model which is presented 
in Columns (1), (4) and (7) of Table 5. The lower part of the table reports the change in 
the coefficients as they have been estimated for the post-May 2001 period; the upper part 
shows the results for the period until our break date. Except for the ordered probit model, 
the Chow tests report clear evidence of a significant break in May 2001. However, it is 
                                                 
18 The latter we include to remove remaining negative autocorrelation from the regression. The qualitative 
results are not affected by this in any way. We, therefore, will not comment on this variable. 
19 Note in this case, the coefficients cannot be interpreted in the usual way; they depend upon the scale of 
the cut-off points. 
  11also clear that a number of estimated coefficients hardly differ from zero. Dropping 
insignificant variables other than our main variables of interest, i.e. indicators related to 
the monetary sector, we arrive at the specifications in Columns (2), (5) and (8). This 
improves the overall fit and makes the break even more pronounced (including in the 
ordered probit model) without affecting the qualitative results. 
A first finding from Table 5 is that the contemporaneous version of our real 
economy measure is highly significant in explaining developments in the main 
refinancing rate. This coefficient is stable across the periods and its lagged version has no 
significant impact. A possible interpretation is that the ECB is using developments in the 
real economy to explain why the main refinancing rate has been set at its present level. Its 
role in preparing the markets for upcoming changes appears all but negligible. 
This does not hold for price developments in the first part of our sample. Up until 
April 2001, a higher value in the previous press release increases the likelihood of having 
a subsequent policy rate increase. As the sum of the contemporaneous and lagged 
coefficients almost equals zero, this effect disappears at the next meeting. Hence, a 
communicated increase in the ECB’s propensity to raise interest rates due to price 
increases is more likely to be followed by an increase in the ECB’s main refinancing rate 
one meeting ahead than during the meeting after which it is communicated. In other 
words, communication with respect to price developments seems to be forward-looking. 
Note, however, that in the later part of the sample the importance of the contemporaneous 
coefficient increases substantially. The reverse holds for the lagged variable. In other 
words, after 2001 the ECB seems to have been more inclined to use communication with 
respect to price developments to explain current interest rate decisions than preparing 
markets for upcoming ones. 
What role did money play in the ECB interest rate decisions? All our results 
hardly show any role for money in actual interest rate decisions. At best one could argue 
(using a 20 percent significance level) that—as with price developments—in the pre-
May-2001 period it was used in a forward-looking manner, i.e. to prepare markets for 
upcoming increases in the main refinancing rate. From then onwards, however, both 
contemporaneous and lagged coefficients for our monetary sector indicator become 
indistinguishable from zero at any plausible significance level. Columns (3), (6) and (9) 
report the results in case variables that are insignificant at the 10 percent level are one at a 
time removed from the specification.
20 This leads to the removal of all monetary sector 
indicators. In other words, when it comes to interest rate decisions our results suggest that 
money does not matter.  
 
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
 
As before, the threshold of May 2001 has been selected on theoretical grounds. 
Figure 5 reports the results when testing for the date of a threshold break in our 
regression shown in Column (5) of Table 5. This time, the highest test statistic prevails 
for November 2
nd, 2000. Clearer than before, the figure shows that a break is most likely 
to have occurred between October/November 2000 and April/May 2001. On the other 
                                                 
20 For ease of comparison we have left the previous change in the main refinancing rate in the ordered 
probit specification. As noted in footnote 18, this does not affect our conclusions. 
  12hand, a break in April/May 2003—the time where the ECB Governing Council changed 
their way of communicated the two pillar strategy—appears to be rather unlikely. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This paper examines the role of money in the monetary policy strategy of the ECB based 
on its policy intentions as communicated in the introductory statement of the ECB 
President at the press conference following Governing Council meetings. We construct 
an indicator of the ECB’s overall policy intention stemming from its aggregated view of 
the economy. In addition, we measure the policy implications of the ECB’s views on 
certain disaggregated economic developments coinciding with the “economic analysis” 
(including the real sector and price developments) and the “monetary analysis”. Our data 
set includes a total of 68 introductory statements extending from January 1999 to 
December 2004. 
In a first step we perform a simple word count which yields two main results. 
First, the relative share of words devoted to the subjects of price developments, real 
economy, and other topics in the introductory statements is about 22-23 percent each, 
while the monetary sector was given somewhat broader coverage in the range of 
33 percent. Second, over time, the relative amount of words devoted to the monetary 
analysis in the introductory statement decreases. The question is whether this also 
suggests a decrease in relative importance when it comes to the communicated ECB 
policy intentions. 
Our analysis of indicators of the ECB’s overall policy stance suggests that 
developments in the monetary sector did not play a significant role most of the time. 
There are, however, indications for a change that contrasts with the simple word-count 
exercise and with the view of many observers: while monetary analysis was never quite 
as important in determining the ECB’s overall policy intentions as price developments or 
the real sector, our results suggest that the ECB has come to rely somewhat more on 
monetary developments over time. In particular, we find evidence for a structural break 
(after which monetary analysis gained in importance) in early 2001, at the upper turning 
point of the interest cycle. There is little indication of a break in May 2003 when the ECB 
presented the outcomes of its evaluations of its monetary policy strategy and changed the 
presentation of the introductory statement. 
Moving from words to deeds, the monetary sector seems to play an even smaller 
role. We show that ECB interest rate decisions are barely influenced by its monetary-
sector based policy intentions. Policy intentions based on developments in the real 
economy and, to a smaller degree, on price developments, are the main factors explaining 
actual policy changes. This holds throughout the sample. To the extent that there is 
evidence of an influence of monetary-sector based policy intentions at all, it is limited to 
the first part of the sample. 
A final result is that, before early 2001, the communicated policy intentions were 
predominantly linked to future interest rate decisions, while, thereafter, they appear 
mainly related to contemporaneous policy decisions. This suggests a declining degree of 
forward-lookingness of communication.  
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Table 1: The introductory statement of the ECB President: some examples 
Date:  Prices:  Real  economy:  Money:
12 3 123 1 2 3
4-Feb-99 confirmed its earlier assessment 
that the outlook for price stability 
remains favourable; there are no 
significant upward or downward 
pressures on prices in the short 
term
0 0 0 confirm our earlier assessment that 
there are downside risks for output 
growth
-1 -1 -1 M3 growth remained very close to 
the reference value; particular the 
developments in credit growth will 
need to be carefully monitored in 
the coming months
000
9-Sep-99 we remain vigilant taking into 
account the upward risks to price 
stability; expectations for inflation 
…. tend to indicate that markets 
still expect an evolution of 
consumer prices, which will 
remain compatible with price 
stability
1 1 1 upturn in economic growth in the 
course of this year
0 0 2 recent monetary developments 
merit close attention; shorter-term 
monetary developments need to be 
interpreted with caution
213
5-Jan-00 consumer price developments are 
expected to remain subject to 
further upward pressure; stability-
oriented behaviour is urgently 
required
2 2 2 confirmed the widely expected 
upturn in growth
1 1 3 no…need to extend the current 
situation of abundant liquidity; 
liquidity conditions…continue to 
be generous
233
14-Dec-00 Governing Council judges the 
risks to price stability still to be on 
the upside
2 2 3 growth continues to prevail 0 1 2 caution continues to be warranted 
with regard to the upside risks to 
price stability stemming from the 
monetary side
112
10-May-01 upward risks to price stability over 
the medium term have diminished 
somewhat
1 0 0 actual economic growth will 
nevertheless be broadly in line 
with trend potential growth
0 0 1 monetary developments no longer 
pose a risk to price stability
000
11-Oct-01 interest rates at the current 
juncture is therefore seen as 
consistent with maintaining price 
stability over the medium term
0 0 0 continue to monitor downside 
risks to the current situation
-1 0 0 we do not judge that monetary 
developments signal risks to price 
stability … the developments of 
M3 will have to be monitored 
carefully in the coming months
102
2-May-02 prospects for price stability appear 
to be somewhat less favourable 
than they were towards the end of 
last year
1 1 2 GDP growth rates in the euro area 
should again be in line with 
potential growth later this year; 
still a number of uncertainties 
surrounding the strength of the 
current upswing
0 0 1 some normalisation in the 
development of M3
102
7-Nov-02 further increase in the annual rates 
of inflation around the turn of the 
year and a delay in the return to 
inflation rates below 2% cannot be 
ruled out; this further increase 
should only be temporary
1 -1 1 Governing Council has discussed 
extensively the arguments for and 
against a cut in the key ECB 
interest rates. The view has 
prevailed to keep interest rates 
unchanged. However, the 
Governing Council will monitor 
closely the downside risks to 
economic growth in the euro area
-3 -1 -1 more liquidity is available than 
would be needed to finance 
sustainable, non-inflationary 
growth. However, given the 
current economic environment, we 
do not see the risk of this 
translating into inflationary 
pressure in the near future
103
8-May-03 current monetary policy stance 
remains consistent with the 
preservation of price stability over 
the medium term
0 0 1 important downside risks to the 
economic recovery have 
diminished; nevertheless, there 
continue to be downside risks
-1 -2 -1 euro area economy continued to 
accumulate liquidity significantly 
above the amount needed to 
sustain non-inflationary growth 213
4-Nov-04 there are upside risks to price 
stability over the medium term; 
strong vigilance is therefore 
warranted with regard to all 
developments which could 
increase such risks
3 1 1 basic determinants of economic 
activity remain consistent with 
continuing economic growth in 
2005; outlook is surrounded by 
continuing uncertainty
0 0 1 remains substantially more 
liquidity in the euro area than is 
needed to finance non-inflationary 
growth; this could pose 
inflationary risks in the future if 




Note: These quotes are selective and do not exhaust the information used to compute the policy intention 
indicators. See the main text for an explanation of the scores listed under the header of “Team”. 
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Overall policy stance 1.00 0.92 0.95 0.58
Price stability stance 1.00 0.86 0.60
Real sector stance 1.00 0.55









Team 1 0.92 0.86 0.92 0.89
Team 2 0.95 0.92 0.93 0.75
Team 3 0.94 0.85 0.97 0.84
Correlation matrix of teams:
Averages
Correlation matrix of averages:
 
Note: The upper panel reports results for the “average” indicators as used in the remainder of the paper. 
The term average means that each of these indicators is computed as the mean of three independently 
generated indicators. The latter are based on the work of three research teams (“Team 1”, “Team 2”, and 
“Team 3”). The lower panel shows the correlation of the “average” indicators with the team-based 
indicators. 
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Table 3: Word count analysis 
Equal mean
Share of words on:   Full sample <May-01 >May-01  p-value  Opt.date p-value
price stability 21.6% 20.7% 22.3% 42.3% 2-Dec-99 40.3%
real economy 22.4% 23.1% 21.9% 52.8% 8-Jan-04 27.5%
monetary sector 33.4% 37.5% 30.7% 2.9% 6-Dec-01 0.0%
other topics 22.6% 18.7% 25.1% 0.5% 5-Jul-01 0.0%
# Obs. 68 27 41
Sample averages Threshold test
 
Note: p-values are reported for the Andrew and Ploberger (1994) test using Hansen’s (1997) 
approximations. 
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Table 4: Regression results explaining overall policy intention by underlying 
components 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6)
adj. R
2 0.932 0.942 0.953 0.957 0.957 0.957
Durbin-Watson 1.09 1.71
LM-test 10.23 1.13 1.10 1.49
Significance LM-test 0.00 0.29 0.29 0.22
#  O b s 6 8 6 76 86 7 6 7
Chow-test (sign.level) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
price stability 0.55 0.45 0.74 0.67 0.65 0.70
(7.45) (6.03) (7.72) (6.69) (6.77) (10.38)
real economy 0.49 0.40 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.24
(10.35) (7.35) (4.26) (3.71) (3.68) (3.68)
monetary sector 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.06
(2.52) (2.18) (1.02) (0.77) (0.70)
Lagged overall policy intention 0.20 0.11 0.14 0.14
(3.05) (1.42) (2.41) (2.55)
inflationary pressures -0.34 -0.34 -0.31 -0.36
(-2.62) (-2.53) (-2.48) (-3.55)
real economy 0.47 0.37 0.41 0.40
(5.35) (3.42) (4.63) (4.63)
monetary sector 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.24
(1.99) (1.79) (2.04) (4.77)
Lagged overall policy intention 0.07
(0.65)
Δcoefficients from May 2001 onwards
coefficients up to April 2001
6 7
 
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses. The Chow test is checking joint significance of the coefficients in the 
bottom part of the table, i.e. testing whether we can reject the null hypothesis of having no break. 
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Table 5: Regression results explaining which components used in the press 
statements drive actual interest rate decisions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
adj./pseudo R
2 0.984 0.985 0.985 0.290 0.311 0.309 0.615 0.599 0.538
Durbin-Watson 2.18 2.21 2.16 2.11 2.12 2.10
LM-test 4.14 4.81 3.22 1.77 1.86 1.39
Sign. LM-test 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.18 0.17 0.24
# Obs 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107
Chow-test (sign.) 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00
Constant 0.19 0.19 0.09
(1.65) (2.59) (1.77)
MMR before 0.96 0.95 0.97
 meeting (35.38) (55.18) (68.58)
Previous ΔMRR -0.25 -0.25 -0.22 -0.26 -0.24 -0.21 -8.85 -8.63 -5.82
(-1.88) (-2.83) (-2.48) (-1.99) (-2.63) (-2.34) (-0.68) (-0.64) (-1.13)
Price stability -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 -0.15 -0.14 -0.14 -2.23 -1.87 -2.04
(-2.09) (-2.59) (-3.14) (-2.68) (-3.07) (-3.74) (-0.84) (-1.35) (-2.17)
Lagged price 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.13 3.99 2.62 3.12
 stability (2.00) (3.02) (3.85) (2.08) (2.24) (3.36) (1.29) (2.10) (3.55)
Real economy 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.08 2.42 1.29 1.23
(1.03) (2.95) (2.93) (1.28) (3.55) (4.83) (0.90) (1.94) (2.08)
Lagged real 0.01 -0.03 -1.60
 economy (0.15) (-0.47) (-0.59)
Monetary sector -0.09 -0.09 -0.05 -0.04 -0.68 -0.83
(-1.45) (-1.64) (-0.92) (-0.84) (-0.36) (-0.34)
Lagged monetary 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 2.04 2.24





Previous ΔMRR -0.01 0.06 -2.06
(-0.04) (0.31) (-0.00)
Price stability 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.26 0.26 0.25 7.35 6.56 5.52
(2.74) (3.33) (3.82) (3.42) (4.10) (4.23) (1.56) (2.47) (2.82)
Lagged price -0.19 -0.21 -0.25 -0.22 -0.21 -0.26 -7.35 -5.74 -5.82
 stability (-2.41) (-3.41) (-4.29) (-2.92) (-3.25) (-4.28) (-1.78) (-3.12) (-3.99)
Real economy 0.01 0.02 -0.95
(0.08) (0.22) (-0.28)
Lagged real -0.02 0.00 1.85
 economy (-0.28) (-0.00) (0.56)
Monetary sector 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.57 0.36
(0.72) (0.84) (0.41) (0.35) (0.16) (0.12)
Lagged monetary -0.10 -0.11 -0.09 -0.09 -1.19 -1.62
 sector (-1.20) (-1.40) (-1.08) (-1.14) (-0.29) (-0.50)
Δcoefficients from May 2001 onwards
coefficients up to April 2001
ΔMRR (OLS) MRR (OLS) ΔMRR (ordered probit)
 
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses. The Chow test is checking whether the coefficients in the bottom part 
of the table are jointly significant. The cut-off points for the order probit regression in Column (9) are -3.03 
(between -0.5/-0.25), -2.62 (between -0.25/0), 5.25 (between 0/0.25), and 6.63 (between 0.25/0.5). 
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Price stability Real economy Monetary sector Other topics
Declining interest rates Increasing interest rates
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Declining interest rates Increasing interest rates
 
Note: Approximately every test statistic above 6 rejects the null hypothesis of no break at that particular 
date. 
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